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LIABILITY IN CONDUCT OF RECEIVERSHIPS*
JOSEPH FIRSTt
A receiver is appointed to conduct the business of a corporation in state
X. He enters into contracts and employs agents to assist him. His activities
carry him into state Y. Suppose, in thus conducting the business, he or his
agent commits a tort in state X or in state Y; or suppose he commits a breach
of a contract entered into for the benefit of the enterprise. What is the
receiver's responsibility under these circumstances? Who shall bear the
resultant loss-the receiver, the receivership fund, the defendant corporation,
or the person at whose instance the receiver was appointed? And when we
shall have decided this problem, we must inquire whether for the purpose of
establishing such liability, suit may be instituted in a foreign tribunal or
whether it is limited to the court of appointment. The present research is
directed toward a solution of these problems.
Receiverships, especially corporate ones, are occupying an important
part in equity litigations.' Modern enterprises, based on intricate financial
set-ups, are of greatest value as going concerns. Not only shareholders, but
creditors as well, have come to realize this nuda veritas. For instance, busi-
ness goodwill behind padlocks and drawn blinds is valueless; and mere fix-
tures and stored goods, translated into currency, are scarcely comparable with
the monetary returns of those fixtures and that stored goods in use. As a
*An attempt has been made to isolate the instant problem from those that arise in
connection with-Suits by and against the Receiver, Place of Administration of Assets,
Distribution of Assets, Jurisdiction under Creditors' and Stockholders' Bills. These problems
will be treated in later articles.
tB. S., 1927, L. L. B., 193o, Gowen Fellow, I93O-31, University of Pennsylvania; Case
Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1929-30; member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
'While receivership law has been spoken of as administering the "incidents of a decent
funeral" to a "financial last illness", the "miracle of a resurrection" is not entirely infre-
quent. See William H. Lloyd, Book Review (193o) 28 MicHi. L. REv. 471. Municipal,
railroad, insurance, and banking corporations being unable to come within the federal bank-
ruptcy act generally fall into the equity receivership category. See ii U. S. C. A. § 22
(i927). Railroad receiverships comprise a large part of the decisional law on receiverships.
(943)
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
corollary, the proper administration of the business of a corporation that
has been entrusted to a receiver often, of necessity, requires continued oper-
ation. Such proceeding may be doubly warranted: it is an effective and
adequate means of preserving assets and realizing the maximum for the
interested parties; it is essential for the sake of public welfare when a public
utility goes into receivership.
View of English Courts
Unlike the American courts, the courts of England have not been over-
anxious to concede to a receiver the management of a business. Accordingly,
they have based the determination of the liability of a receiver upon an
analogy between a managing receiver and any other individual who, in a
fiduciary capacity, carries on a business. In the latter situation, the rule has
always been that the executor or trustee who, by the terms of the instrument
appointing him, is directed to supervise an enterprise for the benefit of others,
is prima facie personally liable on his contracts.
2
When a receiver undertakes to manage a business, it cannot be said that
he is an agent of the company, since the usual incidents of the relationship
are strikingly absent. The company, on the one hand, did not appoint the
receiver to whom control of the assets has been given and he, on the other
hand, is not subject to its command; so, if the receiver were even to purport
to contract on the company's behalf, he might be liable for breach of warranty
of authority.3 Manifestly, only the court can dismiss the receiver or guide
him as to the mode of conducting the business, or interfere with him in the
event that he fails to discharge his role properly. The incidents of this rela-
tionship to the court are such as would, if they existed between a receiver and
an ordinary person, create the status of agent and principal; yet to hold that
the receiver is the agent of the court would be to render the court liable for
the agent's authorized contracts-an impossible conclusion.
Consequently, the English courts draw the analogy between the executor
or trustee on the one hand and the receiver on the other. In so doing, they
express the desire that the receiver shall, in pursuance of his appointment,
act on his own responsibility, appear to the world as to the person carrying
on the business in the usual way, and look for indemnity to the assets or the
persons for whose benefit ultimately the business is being conducted. 4 How-
ever, where the receiver is bankrupt and the liability has been incurred in
the proper management of the estate, the court is reluctant to place the loss
on the creditor, and will therefore pay him directly out of the funds in its
2See Rigby L. J., in Burt v. Bell [1895] I Q. B. 276 at 284.
3 DeGrelle, Houdret & Co. v. Bull, I Manson 118 (1894). See on appeal, Gaskell v.
Gosling [1897] A. C. 575.
'Lord Esher, M. R., and Rigby, L. J. in Burt v. Bell, supra note 2; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1927) § 183.
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handsY And, as in the case of the executor, when the transaction gives rise
to the inference that the receiver did not pledge his personal credit, the per-
sonal liability rule will not be applied.'
The English rules as to the liability of a receiver in contract appear to
apply also to the situation in which a tort is committed, either by the receiver
or by one of his servants. There is, however, a dearth of cases on this point.
7
The personal liability rule makes a suit against the receiver a relatively
simple matter. If the receiver is as liable on contracts he makes for the
receivership as he would be on any contract he makes for himself, then the
sequiturs are obvious. In the first place, the question as to whether one
would have to secure the consent of a court of appointment before a suit
could be instituted would not arise, and in the second, the judgment so entered
would clearly be valid in any other jurisdiction.
As a practical matter, the result of the English rule has been conserva-
tism on the part of receivers, and "we do not find in the English reports
accounts of losses by receivers and depletion of assets under receivers' opera-
tions, as is frequently found in the American reports"."
View of American Courts
The American courts have almost uniformly opposed the personal liabil-
ity theory. They have reasoned deductively that, if receivers could be ex-
posed to individual responsibility, no prudent man would accept the trust,
especially in cases in which a vast number of subordinates would have to be
employed. No cautious person would expose himself to the hazard of the
liabilities that might result. So runs the logic. In this respect, receivers
are likened to public officers, who are not individually responsible for their
official contracts nor for torts committed by their subordinates, but only for
torts committed by themselves or for contracts in which they assume to bind
themselves personally. In brief, the theory contemplates that the proceedings
by which a claimant asserts his right against a receiver is analogous to an
action in rem.9
The American rule regarding the liability of receivers in contract has
been rationalized in numerous ways by courts and textwriters. Thus it has
been said that person dealing with a receiver intend that the receiver shall
act in an official capacity because, had the intent been otherwise, a clause
would have been inserted to that effect in the contract.' 0 For example, in a
'Batten v. Wedgewood Coal & Iron Co., 28 Ch. D. 317 (1885) ; London United Brew-
eries Ltd. v. Smith [i9o7] 2 Ch. 511.
0 In re Glasdir Copper Mines [igo6] i Ch. 365.
7 Clark, English and American Theories of Receivers' Liabilities (1927) 27 Co. L. REv.
679", Clark, supra note 7, at 68i.
9 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Central R. R. of Iowa, 7 Fed. 537 (D. Iowa, i8so).
"Livingston v. Pettigrew, 7 Lansing 4o5 (N. Y. 1872) (an assignment running in the
name of "J. P. receiver" and signed "J. P. receiver", containing a covenant that the assigned
claims were due and unpaid).
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New York case in which a draft was drawn "To Receiver, Worcester Cycle
Mfg. Co.," and was accepted "Frank Sullivan Smith, Receiver", it was held
that the receiver was not liable on the draft, because all parties must have
intended to give credit to the receivership alone and no personal liability
could result so long as the receiver disclosed the capacity in which he assumed
to act." Frequently recourse is had to the agency principle in order to
explain why a receiver, acting within the scope of his authority, as defined by
the court, incurs no personal liability.'
2
Both methods of approach are subject to attack. On the one hand,
whatever regard is paid to the intention of the parties is misconceived. For
example, official liability results, although nothing appears as to the intention
of the parties. One is impelled to the conclusion, therefore, that as a matter
of law, the receiver is to be only officially liable, unless a very clear intention
to be personally liable is evidenced. On the other hand, the agency theory
is misleading because it presupposes a responsible principal, whereas no court
has gone to the extent of holding answerable another court for the acts of a
receiver. The furthest anyone has dared to go in this direction is to sug-
gest '3 that a practical plan for controlling a situation in which assets have
been "milked" would be to surcharge both the receiver and the judge who
appointed him.
The cases in which the action against the receiver is predicated upon a
tort are numerous. The instances in which it is sought to charge the receiver
for the negligence of an employee are particularly prevalent in railroad
receiverships. There is merit in the practical consideration which takes
cognizance of the fact that the receiver's relationship to the property and its
operation is entirely official. He has no interest in or control over the earn-
ings; he himself is removable at the pleasure of the court. In law and in
fact the property is the court's for management and administration; the
receiver is the court's officer, executing its orders and obeying its directions.
It is apparent that, in the operation of a large size public utility; it would be
a hardship to impose upon a receiver the hazards and responsibility which
are attached to individuals acting by agents for their own convenience and
profit. To these practical considerations the American courts have given
ear. If the defendant receiver seeks to do by others that which he was
expected and was able to do in person, it is proper that he shall be held
accountable, but if the employment of agents was necessary and if, in the
"Olpherts v. Smith, 54 App. Div. 514, 66 N. Y. Supp. 573 (19oo).
'McGowan v. Ingalls, 6o Fla. 116, 53 So. 932 (I9IO) ; Willetts v. Janecke, 85 Wash.
654, 149 Pac. 17 (1915); BEAcH, REcEIvRs (2d ed. 1897) § 305; and see Vanderbilt v.
Central R. R. N. J., 43 N. J. Eq. 669, 12 Atl. 188 (1887), Brunner v. Central Glass Co.,
18 Ind. App. 174, 47 N. E. 686 (1897). For a few cases apparently to the contrary, see
E CooK, COR'ORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 878; cf. Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402 (1866);
Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395 (1868).
Nelles, Examination of Receivership Precedent for Labor Injunction (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 507, 550.
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performance of his duty, the receiver acted prudently and selected only com-
petent agents, he has discharged his full duty and will not be held responsible
for the acts of agents employed.
14
Logically, there is no escape from the conclusion that the liability of a
receiver ought to be personal, reserving to the receiver the right of indemnity
out of the funds in his hands according to the general principle applied to
trustees, executors and the like. Justice Holmes, in Archambeau v. Platt,5
accurately analyzes the situation: "The universal practice of the American
courts, bold as it may seem in origin, appears to be too well established to be
departed therefrom."
The official liability theory so firmly established by decision has not only
been applied by the courts of the state of appointment, but also by foreign
courts. In Sager Mfg. Co. v. Smith 1" an effort was made to place personal
responsibility upon a receiver appointed by the federal court of Massachusetts
who contracted for goods in the state of New York, but the court saw no
distinction in the cases and no reason for departing from the usual rule.
Several corollaries may be stated to the propositions already considered.
The corporation itself, having no control over the receiver or his servants, is
not, in the absence of an absolute liability imposed by statute, responsible for
the negligence or torts of the employees of the receiver and no suit against
it for damages occasioned thereby can be maintained.17  Similarly, the party
at whose instance the receiver was appointed is not ordinarily chargeable with
the obligations of the receiver.' 8
Maladministration and Duty to Account
Whatever justification there may be for the doctrine that has grown up
in this country as to official liability, it has no place in a discussion of mal-
"Cardot v. Barney, 63 N. Y. 28 (1875). An analogy has been drawn between the
receiver's status and that of a class of quasi corporations which are authorized to conduct
legal proceedings in the name of their officers. Murphy v. Holbrook, 2o Ohio St. 137, 148
(187o). "For torts committed by his [the receiver's] servants while operating the railroad
under his management he is responsible upon the principle of respondeat superior. The
liability, however, is not a personal liability, but a liability in his official capacity only . . .
These rules of law are well settled and have been held in many adjudicated cases and are
laid down in the text-books", McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 Ill. 27o, 27 N. E. 452, aff'd 141
U. S. 327, 12 Sup. Ct. II (89). Concerning the liability of receivers as common carriers
when operating railroads, see Note (19oo) 63 L. R. A. 231. As to costs of receivership see
Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 2o8 U. S. 36o, 28 Sup. Ct. 406 (1907).
0 173 Mass. 249 at 250, 53 N. E. 816 at 817 (1899). The increase in recent years of
the use of insurance as a means of "spreading risk" in the conduct of business enterprises
raises the question whether the practical considerations on which the American courts have
based their view of non-liability of receivers is sound today. Thus the question arises
whether the receiver would not be adequately protected by carrying a sufficient amount of
insurance, the cost of which could be defrayed as a receivership expense.
1045 App. Div. 358, 6o N. Y. Supp. 849 (899).
' McNulta v. Lockridge, supra note 14; Hicks v. International, 62 Tex. 381 (1884);
Ohio v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553 (1864) ; Bell v. Indianapolis, 53 Ind. 57 (1876) ; Metz v. Buffalo,
58 N. Y. 61 (1874). A distinction is made if the receiver and the corporation run the road
jointly. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445 (U. S. 1873).
Is Cf. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, supra note 14; Boehm v. Goodall [1911] 1 Ch. 155.
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administration by the receiver. The safety of those whose property is neces-
sarily placed in the hands of receivers makes it the imperative duty of the
court to restrain and discourage such breaches of trust. This can best be
accomplished by holding a receiver personally liable for the improvident
investment of receivership funds, 19 or the wrongful commingling of such
money,20 or gross neglect in giving no attention to the duties of the office.
21
Once such argument is accepted, we are then met by the problem: To which
court may such receiver be called to account? In the case of executors and
administrators it has been said that a "logical application of the principle that
the administration of the estate in each State is an independent matter",
22
compels the result that the responsibility for an accounting shall be to the
court of appointment. While complete independence is ordinarily not an
end sought after in the administration of receivership assets, it would appear
inadvisable to call the receiver away from the court which appointed him,
which exacted his official bond, and to which by the terms of that bond he
must account.2 3  To allow him to be called to account in another court for
his wrongful conduct in the administration of the assets or for his failure to
make a final accounting would be to lose an effective concentration of the
control over the receiver by the court best informed for this purpose.
Personal Torts
There are a number of cases and much dicta to the general effect that for
his own tortious acts, as distinguished from those committed by his agents,
the receiver is personally liable.2 4 As in the maladministration cases, there is
no reason for an official liability rule. Thus, where there has been failure to
file a claim against the estate,2 5 or a conversion of non-receivership prop-
erty,26 the plaintiff may hold the receiver personally answerable. It does not
follow, however, that the plaintiff may not, in some situations, find it ex-
tremely advantageous to be allowed to charge the receivership funds where
the personal estate of the receiver is insolvent. On the other hand, at least
10 Collins v. Gooch, 97 N. C. 186, 1 S. E. 653 (1887) (the duty was of a positive obliga-
tion imposed by statute which in turn was merely a recognition of a safe rule for the pres-
ervation of the property).
"United Ins. Co. v. Lynch, ii Paige 520 (N. Y. 1845).
21 Commonwealth v. Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 96 Mass. 344 (1867) (where one of two re-
ceivers misappropriated the fund).
2 GooDRicH, op. cit. supra note 4, § 187.
c3 Conkling v. Butler, 4 Biss. 22 (C. C. Ind. 1865) ("the mere statement of the case
thus made by the bill is enough to show the impossibility of sustaining it"). Cf. Hinckley v.
Railroad Co., 100 U. S. '53 (1879).
2' Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Central R. R. of Iowa, supra note 9; Cardot v. Ashbel,
63 N. Y. 281, 287 (1875); Archambeau v. Platt, supra note 15, at 250, 53 N. E. at 817-(i8 9).
I Keene v. Gackle, 56 Md. 343 (1881).
"Kirk v. Kane, 87 Mo. App. 274 (igoo) (comparison made to a sheriff who takes
property of one not a defendant).
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one court has accepted the doctrine that the receiver may have recourse to his
fund when he has been required to pay a judgment against himself.27
The criterion in the personal tort cases is this: If the tort is such as can-
not, in fairness, be considered one arising out of the business, the court will
not only hold that the liability of the receiver is personal but it will not even
allow the claimant to resort to the receivership assets if the receiver is
execution-proof. On the other hand, if the wrong is reasonably connected
with the operation of the business, the mere fact that the receiver is personally
liable does not compel the conclusion that the claimant must look solely to
him for payment. Thus, when a receiver has caused injury by wrongfully
securing an injunction, the court might very well allow the receivership prop-
erty to be used to meet the claim.2s The rule is definitely established that
where the negligence is an act of a servant, the assets are to be charged. It
would appear, therefore, that where, for example, the receiver is execution-
proof, the mere fact that it may no longer be improper to render a personal
judgment ought not, of itself, to place the claimant in a worse position, even
though the receiver himself and not his agent has committed the wrong.
Acts in Excess of Authority or Pursuant to Void Orders
Many instances arise in which a receiver either assumes to contract
without authority to do so, or in which the particular tort committed by the
receiver's servants occurred during the performance of an operation in excess
of the receiver's authority. Such want of authority often arises merely be-
cause of the omission from the order or decree of the court of language suit-
able to confer the power.
In Ryan v. Rand,29 the plaintiff, who was a stenographer, had been
employed by the attorney for the receiver. She was permitted to bring suit
against the receiver personally to recover for services rendered, because the
court was of the opinion that the defendant had possessed no authority to
make the demand a charge upon the estate. The court intimated, however,
that after the receiver had paid the judgment, he might charge it in his ac-
counts and have it sanctioned in this fashion. To similar effect is the case
of Sayles v. Jordan,3 ° wherein a personal action against the receiver of a
railroad was held to lie for merchandise furnished to a hotel which he had
assumed to run in connection with the railroad. In like manner a receiver
who executed a note signed "Hickey, Receiver", and who had no authority
to bind the assets by such a note, was personally liable, even though the
Gutsch v. Mcllhargey, 69 Mich. 377, 37 N. W. 303 (1888) (this is a matter to be
settled by the court that appointed him).
Cox v. Stone, 146 La. 81, 83 So. 385 (1919). Cf. I CLARK, REmcVERS (2d ed., 1929)
§ 392 b. To the argument that shareholders and creditors will suffer it has been said that
if the act is ultra vires they could have resort to the surety's bond).
'2o Abb. N. C. 313 (N. Y. 1887).
Z02 N. Y. Supp. 827 (1888) ; aff'd 121 N. Y. 685, 24 N. E. lo98 (189o) ("there is no
evidence that the defendant was running this hotel as receiver by direction of the court").
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payee took the note knowing it to have been executed in the receiver's repre-
sentative capacity, and mistakenly believing that the receiver had authority
to execute the note in such capacity.31 It seems proper that where the receiver
has acted in excess of his authority, the liability should be personal. This
has been held true, even though the expenses incurred were necessary for the
preservation of the property. A receiver may not, of his own motion, con-
tract debts chargeable upon the fund. And while a court may allow expenses
incurred by a receiver for the preservation of the property, it is nevertheless
the order of the court and not the act of the receiver which creates the charge
and determines its validity.
3 2
The act of the receiver, as has been indicated, may be in excess of his
authority, such want of authority existing because of an omission in the
appointing order. A more complicated problem is presented when the want
of authority is predicated not upon the omission in the order, but upon the
lack of jurisdiction in the court to confer the authority.
Several cases within this class are deserving of some study. In Kain v.
Smith 33 the defendant had been appointed receiver of the Vermont Central
Railroad by the court of chancery of the state of Vermont. By the decree
of such court he was authorized to lease and operate the Ogdensburg and
Lake Champlain Railroad which was wholly within the state of New York.
The defendant made the lease and assumed to operate such railroad as re-
ceiver. An accident occurred in which an employee upon the leased line was
injured, and an action was brought against the defendant receiver personally
to recover damages for the injury. The defendant was held personally liable.
The theory underlying the decision was that the Vermont court had no
jurisdiction over the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad, or over its
property rights or franchises. It had no power to clothe its agent with such
authority. It could not invest him with any official status in the operation
of the leased railroad in a foreign state cognizable by the courts of that state.
The power of the Vermont court was, therefore, exhausted when it granted
to its receiver the permission to lease the railroad, and such permission could
only become useful upon the accounting of the receiver in the court which
appointed him. Any other rule, the court thought, would unwisely allow the
' Peoria Steam Marble Works v. Hickey, Iio Iowa 276, 81 N. W. 473 (1900) ("de-
fendant may charge the funds for the amount recovered against him if the contracts were
of benefit to the estate or funds in his hands . . . as he had no authority to bind any
person but himself, the notes are his, and he cannot have them reformed"). Cf. § 20 of the
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW. Consider Livingston v. Pettigrew, supra note IO, wherein
it is said that even considering a covenant that the assigned claim would be paid as void
because the receiver exceeded his powers and that it did not bind the estate, he was not
personally liable, for under the circumstances it would not be construed as a personal
covenant. Notice how the court fails to realize that the logic of the situation would always
require us to find personal liability.
Rogers v. Wendell, 61 N. Y. 540 (1889). See BEACH, REcEI vEs § 305. Cf. Stanton
v. Alabama, 2 Woods 506 (U. S. 1875) (the case involved exceptions to a report of a
master as to settling accounts).
'38o N. Y. 458 (88o).
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receiver to operate, control and manage an entire railroad and its property
outside the state of his appointment with no liability except such as the
appointing state approved.
Lyman v. Central Vermont Railway 34 involved facts similar to those
of the preceding case, except that in the latter case the property was entirely
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court appointing the receiver. Justice
Powers remarked that the order of the court sanctioning the receiver's
engagement in outside business entirely foreign to the administration of the
property in the hands of the court was available to him in the settlement of
his accounts, but not in the determination of his responsibility to third per-
sons. These decisions are consistent with the proposition that, if the acts
of the receiver are pursuant to an order of the court which is void because
beyond the power of the court, such ultra vires acts may subject him to per-
sonal liability which may extend to cover liability arising from the negligence
of his employees over whom he exercises control and supervision.
The query, of course, must be answered: Were these acts in fact void
and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to authorize? What shall be the
test? An order of a court obviously ought not to be considered void merely
because it contemplates the doing of an act outside the state. Thus, in
Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Phila. R. & N. E. R. Co.," the court
said:
"If the receiver in operating the road finds it necessary to send his
employees into another State he may do so; and the fact that he does so
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to direct him as to their
wages. . . . It is true that no court can enforce its decree beyond the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction; but it is also true that by a rule of
comity 36 based in part on paramount necessity, the authority of receivers
appointed in one State will be recognized in many ways by the courts of
another State within whose jurisdiction it may be exercised." 37
Such an attitude is fundamentally sound, founded as it is upon a recog-
nition that state lines cannot delimit fields of commercial activity. For exam-
''89 Vt. 167, 1o AtI. 346 (1887).
'69 Conn. 7o9 at 717, 38 Atl. 792 at 794 (1897).
' While the courts speak of comity the proper viewpoint is that "conflict of laws is
based upon prevalent notions of convenience, like all other law; and not on 'comity' as is
generally stated." Francis, Domicile of a Corporation (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 335, 339;
YOUNG, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND OTHER CORPORATIONS (1912) 15, 19, and works there
cited; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 6. Cf. STORY, CC.NFLICT OF
LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 3-7; WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922) Io; Note (1927)
36 YALE L. J. 694.
Compare suits by a foreign receiver. The state courts have from the outset usually
refused to recognize suits by a foreign receiver as a matter of right, but have generally
permitted such suits as a matter of privilege when local creditors were not involved. The
early English cases recognized the title of a foreign assignee vested with title pursuant to
involuntary proceedings and as a corollary, allowed a suit by such receiver as a matter of
right. See 3 PIGGOTT, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND JuRIsDICTION (191o) 98; Er parte Blake,
1 Cox Eq. 398 (Eng. 1787); Selkrig v. Davies, L. R. 15 Eq. 383 (1873); Grimshaw v.
Galbraith [191o] I K. B. 339; In re MacFadyen [igoS] I K. B. 675.
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ple, it is not at all unusual for the receiver to purchase supplies outside of the
state of appointment. This specific situation arose in a New York case. 3s
The problem was whether in making purchases for a bicycle manufacturing
concern the receiver appointed by the United States Circuit Court for the
district of Massachusetts was confined to the State of Massachusetts, or
whether, if he purchased from dealers in New York, it was at the risk or
certainty of being personally liable. The court, in refusing to find personal
liability, distinguished Kain v. Smith on its facts in this fashion:
"If the defendant had assumed as receiver to lease and operate a
factory of the plaintiff and had purchased supplies for its operation from
other parties for which recovery was sought, the case would be analogous
to Kain v. Smith, . .
The fact that territorial limitations per se cannot be considered as fur-
nishing a criterion for the voidness of the court order is well illustrated by
Rosso v. Freeman.4" In that case a Connecticut receiver of a Connecticut
corporation operated a bus line between Hartford in the state of Connecticut,
and Springfield, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts. The court felt
unprepared to say that if the receiver's employee subjected the defendant to
liability by acts of negligence, the liability would be personal if committed in
Massachusetts and official if committed in Connecticut. "I see no rational
ground," said the court, "for thinking that the defendant thus stepped out of
his official character at the state line."
The cases seem to indicate that if a court orders the receiver to do acts
outside of the state,41 such order may give rise to official liability if the act
for which recovery is sought relates to property within the jurisdiction of the
court under the receivership decree. It would appear also that the order
should be considered of effect in determining liability if the act has to do
with property of the defendant corporation in another state, so long as no
ancillary receiver has been appointed. But if, in pursuance of the order, the
receiver carries on a business too far removed from the primary one, or
enters into transactions not reasonably related to the business of the defendant
corporation, the court will be regarded as having exceeded its authority, at
least to the extent that its receiver, not having the protection of a valid official
status, may be held personally liable in a foreign state.
I Sager Mfg. Co. v. Smith, supra note 16. The court stated its conclusion thus-"Where
a receiver of a corporation is duly appointed by a court of a sister state and given authority
to continue the business of such corporation and to make purchases for that purpose, such
receiver may make such purchases in the state in which he was appointed, or any other
state, provided only that he discloses the character in which he assumes to act and the
source of such authority." At 368, 6o N. Y. Supp. at 856.
Ibid. at 367, 6o N. Y. Supp. at 855.
*°3o F. (2d) 826 (D. Mass. 1929).
"In Sager Mfg. Co. v. Smith, supra note 16, the receiver was a federal receiver who
ordinarily is strictly limited to his territorial limits-but the question was not raised.
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Underlying the doctrine of the cases in this section is the recognition
that as a matter of logic a receiver's liability should be personal, but that as a
matter of business convenience a contrary result should obtain. Therefore,
when business convenience no longer necessitates freedom from personal lia-
bility, a receiver is to be treated no differently from any other individual.
This is also the case in criminal prosecutions against a receiver. Thus no
difficulty is found in holding a receiver for embezzlement 42 or for commit-
ting a nuisance,43 although in accordance with criminal law a strict interpre-
tation of penal statutes sometimes necessitates the conclusion that a receiver
was not within the purview of the particular statute.
4 4
Leave of Court to Sue
There has been a marked difference of opinion as to whether leave of
the court appointing the receiver is necessary before suit may be brought
against the receiver and as to whether a failure to allege the granting of such
leave affects the jurisdiction of the court entertaining the suit. Not a little
of the confusion has been occasioned by failing to inquire whether a different
rule might not be applicable to pre-receivership claims as distinguished from
claims arising out of transactions within the scope of this article.4 ' Also it
is not uncommon to find that jurisdiction, in the sense of power over the
person and subject matter has been confused with jurisdiction in the sense of
advisability of exercising such power.
Most of the cases descend from either one or the other of the opinions
in the case of Barton v. Barbour,"' which has been assumed to lay down a
general rule on the subject. The majority opinion by Justice Woods pro-
ceeded upon the basis 4' that if the plaintiff had the right to prosecute his
case to judgment without leave of the court appointing the receiver, he would
have the right to enforce satisfaction of it. By virtue of his judgment he
could, unless restrained by injunction, seize upon the receivership property
or attach its credits. Thus, if the judgment were recovered outside the ter-
"Fields v. United States, 27 App. D. C. 433 (igo6).
,' State v. Railroad, 152 N. C. 785. 67 S. E. 42 (igio)-the case directly involved the
liability of the corporation itself and on this the ruling was that the railway company could
not be indicted, for no man nor corporation should be made criminally responsible for acts
which he had no power to prevent. BrsHoP, CRImINAL LAW §§ 42I, 422.
" People v. Blair, 183 Mich. 130, 149 N. W. lO39 (1914) ; United States v. Harris, 177
U. S. 305, 20 Sup. Ct. 6og (igoo) ; cf. Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280, 34
Sup. Ct. 829 (1913).
See Nelles, Legal Consequences of a Strike (931) 4o YALE L. 3. 547, 551.
0 io4 U. S. 126 (1881).
" The reason for the rule has been said to be found in the necessity of protecting re-
ceivers against unnecessary and oppressive litigation, as well as in the desirability of com-
pelling all claimants against the fund or property in the receiver's hand to assert their
demand by motion, or otherwise, in the proceeding in which he was appointed, thus admin-
istering complete justice to all claimants in one and the same proceeding. See the observa-
tion of the court in DeGroot v. Jay, 30 Barb. 483 (N. Y. 1859). The rule is attacked as
illogical and unsupported by legal reasoning by Hugh, Right of Action against Receiver of
Other Courts (1876) 2 So. L. Q. (N. s.) 576.
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ritorial jurisdiction of the court which appointed the receiver, the plaintiff
-could seize the property outside such state, while the court which appointed
the receiver and was administering the assets was impotent to restrain him.
The effect of any attempt to enforce satisfaction of the judgment would be
precisely the same as if suit had been brought for the purpose of taking
property from the possession of the receiver.
4
8
The objection to a procedure which contemplates and accepts such abso-
lute control in the court of appointment may not be so serious when the
purposes of the receivership are to wind up the affairs of the corporation,
to discharge its debts, and to distribute the remaining assets, if any, among
the shareholders. But where the receiver is to continue the business it seems
unreasonable to say that all parties deal with him on the implied understand-
ing that they must resort to the court of appointment for relief. This is the
tenor of the argument of Justice Miller in the dissenting opinion in Barton v.
Barbour, where it was pointed out that the majority opinion was not in accord
with the practice of the court of chancery in England, in which, if it was
thought that the plaintiff in any action was interfering with the functions of
a receiver, the court could punish him for contempt.
The weight of authority 49 to the effect that failure to obtain permission
to sue a receiver does not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which suit
is brought descends from this dissent by Justice Miller. He saw the prob-
lem 50 as one of whether equity would here exercise its own acknowledged
jurisdiction of restraining suits at law and itself dispose of the matter in-
volved. A plaintiff in such case desiring to prosecute a legal claim for
damages against a receiver might very properly obtain leave to prosecute 51
in order to relieve himself from the -possibility of having his proceedings
arrested by an equity court (assuming the law court could secure personal
jurisdiction).
The federal courts 52 by the practice of embodying in the decree a gen-
eral leave to sue reached the result desired by Justice Miller. Still later, the
Judicial Code 5 specifically provided that "Every receiver or manager of any
court of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or transaction
'To the same effect-Black, Actions by and against Receivers (886) 34 AMs. L. REG.
289, 299. Many cases allow waiver by receiver: Hubbel v. Dana, 9 How. Pr. 424 (N. Y.
1854); Black doubts that the privilege is personal. The result foreseen in Barton v.
Barbour is not a complete sequitur as the cases under "Effect of Judgment" infra indicate.
See also Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 479, 13 Sup. Ct 1008, 101l (1893).
" Rosso v. Freeman, supra note 4o, disagrees as to the weight of authority.
'Justice Miller recognized that Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74 (1864), so saw the
problem.
"' If the suit is brought outside the state and the plaintiff was not in the state at the
time of the decree appointing the receiver, no equitable interference would be possible, it
would seem. No contempt would appear to be involved since the possession of the receiver
is not interfered with. See on the contempt question Nelles, Legal Consequences of a
Strike, supra note 45, at 542, 547.
The practice was started by Judge Caldwell. Caldwell, Receiverships in Federal
Courts (1896) 30 Am. L. REv. 161.
13§ 66, 28 U. S. C. A. 125 (1928).
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of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the
previous leave of the court in which such receiver or manager was appointed;
but such suit shall be subject to the general equity jurisdiction of the court
in which such manager or receiver was appointed." 5-
Where the liability of the receiver with respect to management of the
business is personal, there is substantial agreement that no permission to sue
the receiver need be sought. 5 No court feels that the receiver must be pro-
tected when he is traveling beyond the line marked out for him by the court.' 6
As a conclusion, it might be stated that "while the better considered
authorities formerly supported the proposition that leave to sue the receiver
was jurisdictional in -its nature, the great weight of authority as the result of
the later decisions sustains the opposite view and it is accordingly held that
the failure to obtain leave is not jurisdictional and that its omission is not
fatal to the action." 57
Effect of Judgment Against Receiver Officially
The reasoning in Barton v. Barbour is much influenced by what the
court thought would be the result of a judgment rendered against a receiver
officially. When a plaintiff sues a receiver in a foreign court for breach of
a contract made by the latter in his representative capacity, is the plaintiff
attempting to control the official acts of the defendant receiver? Can it be
said that he is seeking to reach property in the receiver's hands which, if it
is in another state, is subject to control and disposition by that state? Or is
the plaintiff simply endeavoring to have his claim against the defendant
adjudicated and established in a foreign state?
The cases 51 clearly indicate that the judgment in substance and fact is
not against the receiver, but is against the funds and property in his hands
'The interpretation of "subject to general equity jurisdiction" is given infra under
"Effect of Judgment."
' Kirk v. Kane, supra note 26, BEACH, RECEIVERS (Alderson's ed. 1899) 663; SMITH,
RECEIVERS (2d ed. 190o) i89; HIGH, REcErIvs (4th ed.) 257; cf. I CLARIK, RECEIVERS (2d
ed. 1929) 549, also see 549 (c).
Accordingly it is held that if the receiver takes possession of property not embraced
in the receivership, the protection of the court will not be accorded to him. As to such he
may be sued without leave. Brooke v. Kettler, 66 Ala. -6, 51 So. 94o (191o) ; Hills v.
Parker, IIi Mass. 5og (1873) (replevin for locomotive used on railroad but not property
of defendant corporation) ; Gutsch v. McIlhargey, supra note 27; Kenney v. Ranney, 96
Mich. 617, 55 N. W. 982 (1893).
"- HIGH, RECEIVERS § 254 (a). BEACH, op. cit. supra note 12, 724. Baker v. Denver
Tramway Co., [and cases cited) 72 Colo. 233, 21o Pac. 845 (1922). A writer in (1876)
3 CENT. L. J. 427 argues that unless consent is secured the court appointing the receiver
would have the right, and might in many cases deem it proper to require a reexamination,
on its merits, of the controversy, before permitting satisfaction of the execution.
'See Murphy v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137, 148 (187o); Davis v. Duncan, ig Fed.
477 (C. C. S. D. Miss. 1884); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Central R. R. of Iowa,
supra note 15; McNulta v. Lockridge, supra note 14. "Actions against the receivers are in
law actions against the receivership, or the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his con-
tracts, misfeasances, negligences and liabilities .are official and not personal, and judgments
against him as receiver are payable only from the funds in his hands." Cf. Morris v. Hiler,
57 How. Pr. 322 (N. Y. 1879) wherein a fund in the hands of the receiver could not be
distributed, for provision had not been made for payment of a judgment of plaintiff re-
covered in an action of false imprisonment for certain proceedings of the receiver's attorney.
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qua receiver, "in other words, against the matter of the receivership, which a
court of chancery authoritatively organized in a certain cause of equity pend-
ing therein . . The judgment is, as it were in the nature of a judgment
in rem and the res is the matter of the receivership, . , . the administra-
tion in the chancery court of the trust, and the fund and property which are
the subjects of the trust." 50
Under the official liability theory the receiver is sued as such and merely
because he is, for the time being, the tangible representative of the property
of the receivership. The plaintiff in the event of his success in establishing
his claim must necessarily enforce any judgment which he may recover in
accordance with the laws of the state of administration. 0 If there are
assets of the defendant corporation under control of the defendant receiver
within the jurisdiction rendering the judgment, there is no legal objection to
requiring satisfaction out of such fund in the course of local administration,
but in the absence of such administration the judgment serves as proof of
the claim wherever the assets are to be distributed.
When the liability of the receiver is official, therefore, it would be legal
error to award a judgment against the receiver personally and to issue exe-
cution therefor.31 The judgment would have to be entered against him as
receiver and specifically or by reasonable inference made payable out of funds
held by him in that capacity in the due course of administration. -2 But
manifestly after the'court that appointed the receiver has discharged him and
withdrawn him from all control or right to control the property, it cannot be
said that the representative character continues. A judgment against the
" McNulta v. Lockridge, supra note 14, at 28o, 27 N. E. at 453.
'° LeFevre v. Mathews, 39 App. Div. 232, 57 N. Y. Supp. 128 (1887).
" The problem as to whether execution may be issued against property in hands of
receiver for judgments secured against the defendant corporation will be dealt with in a
later article. See Noe v. Gibson, 7 Paige 513 (N. Y. 1839) ; Robinson v. Atlantic & Great
West. Ry., 66 Pa. i6b (1870); Wiswall v. Simpson, 14 How. 52 (U. S. 1852) (method
to be followed by persons claiming prior legal or equitable rights) ; Attorney General v.
Supreme Council, 196 Mass. 151, 81 N. E. 966 (19o7) (effect of judgment secured against
defendant corporation after appointment of receiver). See also Riehl v. Margolies, 279
U. S. 218, 226 n. I, 49 Sup. Ct. 310, 313 n. I (1929). An able article by Beach, Effect of
Judgment Claims in Receivership Proceedings (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 674, considers judg-
ments against defendant corporations secured (a) before receivership (b) after receivership
in actions in which the receiver has intervened (c) those rendered after receivership in
which receiver took no part.
Camp v. Barney, ii N. Y. 373 (1875) (receiver appointed by District Court of United
States for Northern District of New York) ; Commonwealth v. Runk, 26 Pa. 235 (1856) (suit
against receivers for taxes, including those that became due after they assumed office);
Sloan v. Central Iowa Ry., 62 Iowa 728 (1883) ; Schmidt v. Garyner, 59 Minn. 3o3, 62 N. W.
265 (1894) ; Pfeffer v. Kling, 58 App. Div. 179, 68 N. Y. Supp. 641 (9oo) ; Vasela v. Grant
Street Elec. Ry., 16 Wash. 6o2, 48 Pac. 249 (1897) ; also to effect that it must be made clear
that the receiver is sued qua receiver, Smith v. Jones Lumber & Mercantile Co., 2oo Fed. 647
(W. D. Wis. 1912) ; Lyons v. Simpsell, 168 Ill. App. 542 (1912) ; Mallott v. Mapes, iii Ill.
App. 340 (1903) (neglect of statutory duty to keep fence repaired) ; Betts v. Bisher, 213
Fed. 581 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914) "while actions against receivers may be brought in the state
courts, they may also be brought in the court in which the receiver was appointed, and
that, notwithstanding that no federal question was involved, and there is no diversity of
citizenship, those courts have jurisdiction upon the ground that the actions are ancillary to
the original suit, and that the judgments recoverable therein are payable from the property
or funds in the course of administration."
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discharged receiver, who is no longer the representative of the property in
any respect, would not bind the property, and one so rendered would be
fruitless. 3 A corollary would necessarily provide that a successor may be
sued officially for the prior acts of his predecessor. Although one receiver
has passed out of the picture, the identity of the res-the property of the
receivership--has still been preserved. The ground of liability of the suc-
cessor grows out of the relation of the former receiver to the property which
he operated, and of the continuation and identity of that relation between
the property and the receiver."4
No action can be maintained against the receiver after such officer has
been discharged and the property transferred to a purchaser under an order
of court. However, when the final decree reserves to the court power to en-
force as liens upon the property all liabilities incurred by such receiver, 5 such
purchaser takes the property subject to all claims against the receiver. So,
too, if current earnings are invested in capital improvements which without
sale are returned to the company with its other property at the close of the
receivership, then the company must be held to have received the property
charged with the satisfaction of any claim which the receiver ought to have
paid out of the earnings. 6 When the property, however, has been sold free
from all claims in tort or contract, and such claims have been made payable
only out of the purchase price, it seems that a discharge of a receiver before
judgment is rendered in a foreign court should abate any suit there pending,
subject to revival against all persons within the jurisdiction claiming the
fund. 
0 7
The effect of a judgment against the receiver in his official capacity is
further illustrated by the situation presented when a judgment is not paid by
a receiver and the plaintiff seeks to hold the surety on the receiver's bond on
the theory that the receiver has not properly administered the duties of his
trust. Here it is held that the mere fact that the judgment is not paid is not
proof of the receiver's failure to discharge "faithfully the duties of his trust".
Thus he may rely on expenditures made in pursuance of the order of the
court as to distribution. If the effect of the judgment is that particular
money be paid over, a result is achieved similar to the situation where the
'Brown, Receiver v. Gray, 76 Tex. 444, 447, 13 S. W. 472 (I89o); Gray v. Grand
Trunk West. Ry., I56 Fed. 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o7).
", McNulta v. Lockridge, supra note 14.
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Central R. R. of Iowa, supra note 9; Hanlon v. Smith
et al., 175 Fed. 192 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, igog) (purchasers may intervene in suit against
receiver).
'Texas Pac. Ry. v. Johnson, 76 Tex. 421, 13 S. W. 463 (189o) afd, 151 U. S. 81,
14 Sup. Ct. 250 (1893) ; in this case not only was no judgment im rem given but the district
court of Louisiana would seem to have had no jurisdiction to have given such judgment
since the property at all times was in Texas. For the application of current railway income
to current expenses, before the payment of mortgage indebtedness see Gregg v. Metropolitan
Trust Co., 197 U. S, 183, 25 Sup. Ct. 415 (19o).
07Cf. Smith v. Jones Lumber & Mercantile Co., supra note 62 (involving federal re-
ceiver). The decree frequently provides that litigation shall continue till its final determina-
tion against the receiver. I CLARK, RECEIVERS § 574.
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judgment is to pay in due course of administration. A showing that such
particular money has been otherwise distributed under previous order of
court negatives liability on the part of the surety. s
When a judgment is rendered against the foreign receiver personally,
the problem is essentially simple. Ample authority recognizes the rule that
the right and obligation created under foreign law ought to be enforced just
the same as any claim based upon a foreign contract or foreign tort.69 And
it is settled law that such a judgment rendered by a sister state has behind it
the "full faith and credit" clause.70 On the other hand, when the judgment
is rendered against the receiver officially, the considerations are not nearly so
direct. The court had jurisdiction over the defendant receiver and the sub-
ject matter. It chose under the law of the state to render not a personal but
an official liability decree. The jurisdiction was personal yet the judgment
is in the nature of a judgment that might have been rendered in an in. rem
action. Yet the judgment cannot be a lien against.the property in the hands
of the receiver, because such property is in another state, in custodia legis,
and subject to control of the court in possession of the property. American
receivership law thus makes the personal action yield a claim on a special
fund.
The problem is essentially bound up with the principles underlying the
administering of the fund for the benefit of the creditors.-, The federal
courts, since the act permitting suits against federal receivers in state courts
for operations during the receivership, 72 have given practical recognition to
judgments secured as to the amount and validity of the claims. However,
the words "subject to the general equity jurisdiction" of the appointing court
have been interpreted to mean that the time when and the manner in which
the judgment shall be paid, the adjustment of equities between all persons
having claims against the property, and the just distribution of the fund
according to the rights of the several parties interested in it must all neces-
sarily be under the control of the court having custody of the property of
the receiver. 73  The underlying opinion is that the general leave granted by
the federal act to sue in any court would be of no effect unless such were the
rule.
7 4
Coe v. Patterson, 122 App. Div. 76, io6 N. Y. Supp. 659 (19o7).
cGooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 454; cf. Pruyn v. McCreary, 1O5 App. Div. 302,
93 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1905) ; aff'd, 182 N. Y. 568, 75 N. E. 1130 (9o5) (action to be re-
leased from provisions of contract induced by fraud before-attempt to enforce the contract).
7' GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 458.
' Priorities of payment of claims will be dealt with in a later chapter on distribution.
Cf. Pruyn v. McCreary, supra note 69, where the decree did not involve administration of
the fund.
'Supra note 53.
'Dillingham v. Hawk, 6o Fed. 494 (C. C. A. 5th, 1894); Central Trust Co. v. St.
Louis Ry., 41 Fed. 551 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 189o); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v.
Pere Marquette R. R., 263 Fed. 237 (E. D. Mich. 192o).
" Wilcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870 (C. C. A. 4th, I910).
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In the state courts a similar result could easily be made to follow.
Courts holding that leave to sue does not affect jurisdiction to grant a judg-
ment can adopt the doctrine in the federal cases. If the court is committed
to the theory that such failure to receive leave to sue affects jurisdiction, it
can distinguish between the problems where it is asked to give effect to a
judgment rendered elsewhere and where it is asked to render the judgment
in the first instance. Any disinclination to submit to the supposed dictation
of another court in respect to the validity and amount of the claim on the
fund is purely sentimental.7 5  A judgment on the same issues and between
the same parties should not be reinvestigated merely because the property
cannot be reached without the approval of the appointing court.76
7 Beach, Effect of Judgment Claims in Receivership Proceedings, supra note 61, at 68o.
' The writer wishes to express his appreciation of the general supervision and helpful
hints given him by Dean Herbert F. Goodrich, of the University of Pennsylvania Lav
School.
